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Abstract
Migration is one of the main forces shaping our society as we know it. Focusing on the
determinants of migration and its inuence on local communities, this dissertation consists of
three chapters. Chapter 1 provides a brief introduction to the thesis, covering the motivation
for the research, the methodologies used, and policy implications.
Chapter 2 estimates the impact of education on two key outcomes: migration probability
and distance. Migration greatly a¤ects the regional economy, and hence, the out-migration
of highly educated workers has raised serious concerns for regional development. The OLS
estimator indicates a small but positive e¤ect of education on both outcomes, which is similar
to other studies. However, using compulsory schooling law changes as an instrumental variable,
the 2SLS estimator suggests that education increases migration distance but decreases the
probability to migrate. To guide the analysis, this paper expands the basic migration model
to include distance as another element in peoples decisions. The intuition is that by searching
broader distances, people could obtain higher expected incomes, but must also pay higher costs.
The overall e¤ect of education on migration is determined by the trade-o¤ between the cost
and benets of migrating longer distances.
Chapter 3 estimates the inuence of immigration on local housing prices. Housing price is
crucial to peoples well-being, as it not only a¤ects their living conditions, but also a¤ects home-
ownersinvestment values. Both the OLS and 2SLS results suggest that on average immigration
has a slight positive e¤ect on housing prices. However, if we use quantile regression, we observe
quite signicant but heterogeneous e¤ects of di¤erent neighborhoods. For census tracts with
expensive housing, immigrants increase housing prices. For census tracts with cheap housing,
ii
immigrants reduce housing prices. Lower housing prices make housing more a¤ordable for ten-
ants, but reduces homeownerstotal wealth. We also look at possible sources of heterogeneity
from both the supply side and demand side. In poor neighborhoods, for example, immigrants
might drive natives to neighborhoods with better amenities while increasing housing supply in
the area, hence reducing housing prices.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Migration is one of the main forces shaping todays society. History has shown that migration is
not only important for the transfer of manpower, but also important for the subsequent transfer
of culture and skill, hence providing the knowledge and innovation needed for global growth.
In the past decade, for example, China experienced what was probably the most extensive
internal migration in human history. By 2011, more than 158 million rural workers left their
hometown to work in factories in east coast cities. They provide the essential workforce for
the development of the Chinese manufacturing industry and have changed the modern world
economy as a whole. Migration has also provoked intense debates about social justice, equality,
and political reform in China. Since migration has a great impact on both the regions of origin
and destination, this dissertation focuses particularly on the determinants of migration and its
inuences on the destination society.
The second chapter uses the U.S. Compulsory Schooling Law changes as an instrumental
variable to study the impact of education on two migration outcomes: the likelihood to migrate
and how far to migrate within the U.S. in the early 20th century. My analysis indicates that
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education reduces peoples likelihood to migrate out of their birth states, but leads them to
reside in states that are farther away if they decide to move.
The reason why I am interested in this topic is that the out-migration of highly-skilled
workers has long been considered detrimental to regional development, as suggested in the
Brain Drainliterature. If more schooling makes people more likely to move out of the region,
then the local education policy might have a limited e¤ect on regional development and equality.
To correctly evaluate the return to local educational investment and to determine its optimal
level, we need to understand how it would a¤ect individualsmigration behavior. Thus, in my
job market paper, I focus on estimating the impact of education on both migration likelihood
and distance.
Since the goal of the paper is to estimate the causal impact of education, a credible iden-
tication strategy is key. It is well known that education is correlated with many personal
characteristics, which might also a¤ect migration. Such factors include peoples motivation,
health, social networks, and abilities among others. In this paper, I use Compulsory School-
ing Law changes in the early 20th century as an instrument to isolate the e¤ect of education
from those factors. In the past century, the U.S. experienced a series of changes in compulsory
schooling law legislation. These changes are exogenous to individual characteristics and had a
signicant e¤ect on peoples education outcomes. Hence, they are widely used as instruments
when studying the impact of education.
While OLS estimators suggest a positive correlation between education and migration, 2SLS
estimators indicate a di¤erent story. First, contrary to OLS, 2SLS estimator suggests that
one year of schooling decreases the probability of migrating out of ones birth state by 6.6%.
This results challenge the conventional view that education would necessarily increase ones
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likelihood to migrate, as suggested in the Brain Drain literature. Second, similar to OLS,
2SLS estimator implies that an additional year of schooling inuences people to migrate to a
state that is 23.3% farther. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the rst to estimate this
causal relationship.
To correctly identify the coe¢ cients, I include a comprehensive set of controls in the econo-
metric model. Except personal characteristics such as ones age, square of age and gender, I also
included two sets of xed e¤ects. First, I include cohort xed e¤ect to control for nation-wide
shocks that a¤ect all states similarly. Second, I include birth state xed e¤ects to control for
state specic amenities such as the weather, the size and the location of the states. Adding
state-specic time variant variables are important to separate the e¤ect of improved education
from other state trends. Hence I also include linear birth state trends and state-level charac-
teristics, such as state average annual wage in the manufacturing industry and the percentage
of urban population.
To guide the empirical analysis, I include distance as another element in peoples migration
decisions. Distance is an important aspect of migration. It provides a useful proxy for migration
cost, and it determines the range of the spillover e¤ect (that is, the range within which local
education policies could a¤ect neighboring communities). My assumption is that before migra-
tion, people have to choose a distance within which they will search for jobs. This searching
distance determines their expected migration distance as well as their expected income. This is
because if people search in a wider radius, they will nd more job opportunities lead to a higher
expected income. However, they must also pay higher costs. If schooling changes peoples
searching distance, people with di¤erent education levels would be facing di¤erent migration
costs. Hence, they might have di¤erent likelihoods to migrate. By adding a simple component,
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this model is able to generate both positive and negative selection of migrants with respect to
education in a more generalized way.
The main conclusion of this paper is that education does have a signicant impact on
migration outcomes. The conceptual framework suggests that the negative impact of education
on migration probability indicates a high marginal cost of migration distance. This paper
contributes to the literature in three ways. First, to design sustainable policies and reduce
regional inequality, we need to understand what factors cause people to move. If increased
education causes more talented people to stay, policies investing in education might have a
larger e¤ect on local development due to this overlooked channel. Second, understanding the
determinants of migration is important if we are to treat the selection bias it causes. Third,
when evaluating the overall e¤ect of education at the individual level, we should also consider
its inuence on geographic mobility, which o¤ers people wider range of location and job choices,
allowing them to reside in suitable neighborhoods and to move to better opportunities after a
local economic downturn.
In the third chapter, I use instrumental quantile estimation to study how immigration a¤ects
housing prices. The housing market is crucial to peoples well-being. Expenses on housing not
only a¤ect living conditions, but also a¤ect homeownersinvestment values. Only recently, did
researchers start to analyze how immigration a¤ects the price of this particular commodity
(Saiz (2003); Saiz & Wachter (2011)). However, most of the studies focus on the average
e¤ect, overlooking the fact that di¤erent neighborhoods could react to immigration di¤erently.
Immigrants may a¤ect neighborhoods in multiple ways. For example, they can increase cultural
diversity, which could drive up local housing demand or change local crime rates and local
average education levels. The local amenity externality can either bring housing price up or
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down depending on both the characteristics of the immigrants and local communities. Since
di¤erent neighborhoods attract di¤erent immigrants, the induced housing price changes should
not be the same. We thus analyze the neighborhood heterogeneous impacts of immigration on
housing price. Specically, in this paper, we use quantile regression, introduced in Koenker and
Bassett (1978), to analyze how immigration a¤ects di¤erent types of neighborhoods di¤erently
when it comes to the housing market. In other words, we not only ask the question, "Does
immigration matter?", but also consider the question, "For whom does immigration matter?"
Though the average e¤ect of immigration is to increase housing prices, quantile regression
suggests quite heterogeneous e¤ects of di¤erent areas. The OLS estimation suggests that the
share of immigrants in the neighborhood has little e¤ect on the housing price, while the 2SLS
estimation suggests that a 1% increase in the share of immigrants increases housing prices by
0.2%. However, the quantile regression suggests that the impacts of immigrants are quite dif-
ferent for di¤erent neighborhoods, hence looking at the average e¤ect alone will lead to a vastly
underestimated e¤ect. For example, at the 20th percentile of the housing price distribution, a
1% increase in the share of immigrants will lead to a 1.3% decrease in housing prices. Whereas
at the 80th percentile of the housing price distribution, a 1% increase in the share of immigrants
will increase the housing prices by 1%. This result suggests that when we discuss immigration
policy, we have to keep in mind that it might a¤ect di¤erent sub-populations quite di¤erently.
We need to rst understand who benets from policy changes and who pays the cost, then
decide the best policy to improve the overall welfare. The results of immigrantsheterogeneous
e¤ects make homogeneous immigration policy inappropriate. This paper can then provide new
guidelines for policy makers to better regulate immigrants.
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Chapter 2
How is Immigration A¤ected by
Education
2.1 Introduction
Education is a surprisingly strong predictor of migration. People with more education migrate
more frequently and move longer distances (Todaro (1980); Lucas (1997); Greenwood (1997)).
This relationship is of particular interest to policy makers, since the out-migration of highly
educated workers has long been considered detrimental for regional development. To correctly
evaluate the return to local educational policy, it is necessary to determine how it would a¤ect
di¤erent individual outcomes, including their likelihood to migrate and how far they move.
However, we know relatively little about the causal e¤ects of education on migration, even less
about the mechanisms behind it.
To identify the impact of education, this paper utilizes Compulsory Schooling Law (CSL)
changes in the early 20th century to disentangle the e¤ect of education from other confound-
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ing factors. The U.S. experienced a series of changes in compulsory schooling law legislation
in the past century. These changes are widely used as instruments when studying the im-
pact of education, due to their exogeneity to individual characteristics and their signicant
e¤ects on personal education outcomes (Lleras-Muney (2005); Oreopoulos (2006); Pischke and
Von Wachter (2008); Mazumder (2011)). The rst-stage F-statistics suggests that the CSL
changes have su¢ cient power to consistently estimate the e¤ect of education. The second-stage
results indicates that more education increases peoples migration distance if they decide to
move, but reduces their mobility.
The empirical evidence suggests that education does have a positive impact on migration
distance. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the rst to estimate this causal relationship.
Both OLS and 2SLS suggest a positive impact of education, though 2SLS increases the estimated
e¤ect of education by a factor of ten (2.1% v.s. 23.3%). The 2SLS estimator implies that an
additional year of schooling raises migration distance by 23.3% for individuals who migrate.
This e¤ect is relatively large, indicating that one year of education causes people to move an
extra 162 miles, which is roughly the distance between New York City and Boston.
The 2SLS estimator also suggests that education decreases peoples probability of migration,
which is the opposite of what OLS suggests. Estimators in the literature vary (Malamud and
Wozniak (2012); Machin et al. (2012); McHenry (2013)). The negative e¤ect suggested by the
2SLS estimator in this paper is consistent with the results in McHenry (2013)1. However, when
using peoples draft avoidance behavior during the Vietnam War as an instrument, Malamud
and Wozniak (2012) nd that education increases peoples migration probability. The di¤erence
1McHenry (2013) focuses on migration probability only. It uses CSLs as IV but focuses on di¤erent cohorts.
Its main results are not robust after including state trends.
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might indicate di¤erent local average treatment e¤ects at di¤erent education levels, since the
Vietnam War draft mainly a¤ected college education, while the compulsory schooling laws
mainly a¤ected primary and high school education.
To guide the empirical analysis, this paper augments the conceptual framework to include
migration distance. Distance is an important part of migration decisions (Schwartz (1973);
Magrini and Lemistre (2013)), but is rarely incorporated into the migration model. To demon-
strate how education might a¤ect migration, this paper assumes people simultaneously choose
whether to migrate and how far to search for jobs. Before migration, I assume people have
to choose a distance within which they will search for jobs and migrate. If they search in a
wider range, they have a higher likelihood of nding better jobs, but they must pay higher
costs. People with di¤erent education levels search in di¤erent distances, and hence face di¤er-
ent relocation costs. The costs they face will in return a¤ect their likelihood to migrate. The
model shows that the trade-o¤ between the gain of migrating longer distances and the cost of it
are important in determining the overall e¤ect of education on migration. By adding a simple
component, this model is able to generate both positive and negative selection of migrants with
respect to education without assuming di¤erent wage distributions in di¤erent locations as in
Borjas (1999).
This paper contributes to the literature studying the determinants of migration. Migration
usually poses a strong inuence on the local development at both the destination and source
areas. To design sustainable policies and reduce regional inequality, we need to understand what
factors cause people to move. If increased education causes more talented people to stay, policies
investing in education might have a larger e¤ect on local development due to this overlooked
channel. Also, understanding the determinants of migration is important if we are to treat the
8
selection bias it causes. For example, Dahl (2002) suggests that to correctly estimate the return
to education, one needs to compensate individuals likelihood to migrate. This essentially means
estimating migration probability based on peoples observable characteristics.
This study also contributes to the literature examining the impact of education. My results
suggest that education does have a signicant impact on migration. Therefore, when evaluating
the overall e¤ect of education at the individual level, we should also consider its inuence on
geographic mobility, which o¤ers people wider range of location and job choices, allows them
to reside in suitable neighborhoods, and allows them to move to better opportunities after a
local economic downturn (Bound and Holzer (2000)).
Developing world could benet from analyzing historical data in the U.S.. In the early 20th
century, the U.S. shared a lot of similarities with modern developing countries. For example, in
1940, the urbanization rate in the U.S. was 56.5%2, which is very similar to the rate of 52.6% in
China in 20123. Also, in 1940, more than 30.3% of American worked in the service industry and
23.4% worked in the manufacturing industry. Those numbers are 36.1% and 30.3% in China in
20124. The out-migration of highly educated workers, which could loosely referred to as "brain
drain," have raised serious concern for developing regions. The negative causal impact observed
in this study suggests that under certain conditions, local educational programs could encourage
more highly educated workers to stay and may be more benecial to local development than
people originally believed.
2Data from china.org.cn
3Data from US Census, 1940
4Data from Ministry of human resources and social security of the Peoples Republic of China
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2.2 Adding Distance to the Conceptual Framework
To guide the empirical analysis, I augment a simple conceptual framework to include distance
as another choice variable. When considering migration, people are usually faced with two
decisions: whether to migrate and where to migrate. I simplify the second decision as the
choice of how far to migrate. The model shows that the trade-o¤ between the gain of migrating
a long distance and the cost of it is important in determining the overall e¤ect of education on
migration.
In most basic migration models, the only decision people make is whether to migrate after
calculating the utility gain from migration (Borjas (1987), (1999); Chiquiar and Hanson (2005)).
In Borjas (1987), the decision to migrate is further simplied by comparing the expected income
at the current state and the destination state. Assume at current state 0 , an individual faces
the following income:
!0 = 0 + 0E; (2.1)
where !0 is total income, 0 is base income, 0 is return to education, and E is the education
level. If he migrates to destination state 1, he faces a new income !1, and must pay the cost of
migration c. The individual will decide to move if the net gain from migration (f) is positive,
dened as following:
f = !1   !0   c: (2.2)
In reality, people not only decide whether to migrate or not, but also decide where to mi-
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grate. Migration and destination decisions are usually made simultaneously. It is unlikely that
someone would pack up the whole house without knowing where he is heading. To incorporate
the location choice into the model, I simplied the geography of destination states using its
distance from the current state (D). This is essentially assuming that states with di¤erent
distances are di¤erent destination choices, since they may represent totally di¤erent cultures,
job opportunities and accessibility to social networks and information.
In the augmented model, I assume migration cost is an increasing function of distance, since
it has long been considered a serious deterrence to migration in economics literature. Greenwood
(1975) summarized three types of cost that could be proxied by distance. First of all, distance
directly determines the transportation cost of migration. Secondly, distance directly links to
the psychic cost of migration, such as being far away from family members or losing ones
social network. Lastly, when distance increases, the availability of information decreases and
uncertainty increases. People face higher costs if they want to obtain job information from
states far away. Based on these reasons, I assume the migration cost is an increasing function
of distance with a constant marginal cost,
c = cD:
In the model, I also assume future income is positively correlated with distance. One
apparent advantage of migrating a longer distance is that people can reach out to outside labor
markets and hence have more location choices and job opportunities. More job opportunities
entail a better matching quality of nal employment and higher future wages. Consider a
simple scenario in which forward looking workers are searching for new jobs and their expected
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migration distance is determined by their searching radius. If they look for jobs in nearby
regions only, their expected income increase might be small since there might be limited jobs
available. However, if they look for jobs in a broader region, their expected income increase
should be higher because now they are exposed to more opportunities. Therefore, their expected
incomes should be positively correlated with their expected migration distance.
At the same time, people with di¤erent education levels might be facing di¤erent job dis-
tributions, such as di¤erent average incomes and di¤erent income variations. For example,
less-educated workers might nd that jobs are quite similar regardless of where they locate.
Hence their marginal return to researching distance might be lower than the highly-educated
workers. In this paper, I use (E) to capture the e¤ect of education on future income. Based
on the above rationale, I assume the expected wage after migration is a function of distance
and their own education; specically,
!1 = D
(E);
where  > 0. In other words, I assume that the more people venture out of their current
locations and look for jobs, the higher the potential future wages are. The marginal return to
searching distance MRD = @!1@D = D
 1(E) is di¤erent for people with di¤erent education
levels. When @@E > 0; MRD increases as education level increases. When
@
@E < 0;MRD
decreases as education increases.
In incorporating the cost and wage structure, the gain from migration could be rewritten
as the following:
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f = D((E))  (0 + 0E)  cD: (2.3)
The optimal distance is chosen by analyzing the cost benet trade-o¤ of distance. The rst
order condition of Equation (2.3) with respect to D requires that the marginal cost (c) is equal
to the marginal benet (D 1) at the optimal distance. Solving for the optimal distance
gives
D = [=c  (E)]1=(1 ):
When 0 <  < 1; the second order condition is satised and the optimal distance exists. Taking
the derivative of D w.r.t. E, we can see that when @@E > 0; education increases optimal
distance; when @@E < 0;education decreases optimal distance. Recall that
@
@E determines how
MRD changes when education level changes. The model implies that if less-educated workers
face a lower MRD due to reasons such as a more homogeneous labor market, they will search
and migrate a shorter distance. However, if they face a higherMRD, they will migrate a longer
distance.
Knowing their optimal distance D if they search and move, potential migrants will chose
whether to migrate or not based on their net gain of migration, f(D): The e¤ect of their
own education on migration benet @f(D
)
@E is determined by the structure of migration cost
and return to distance. Recall that the optimal distance is D = [=c  (E)]1=(1 ): After
plugging D into Equation (2.3), we obtain the function of net gain of migration f(D). The
rst derivative of f(D) with respect to education determines how education a¤ects peoples
decisions to migrate. Taking the derivative of the benet function with respect to education
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level could yield the marginal e¤ect of education, which is
@f(D)
@E
= (


)

1 
@
@E
  0:
In most scenarios, the education groups that have higher return to searching distance will
migrate further and also more frequently. However, in some special cases, such as when @@E > 0
and when the marginal cost is su¢ ciently large, @f(D
)
@E could be negative while
@D
@E is positive,
indicating that highly-educated workers migrate longer distances but are less likely to move.
An example might help elucidate the mechanisms for the special case. Consider a computer
developer and a construction worker. Assume that the o¤ered incomes vary more for the
developer than for the construction worker in di¤erent locations. Therefore, the developer has a
higher incentive to conduct a nation-wide, sometimes even global, search before she switches job
and migrates. Now knowing the long-distance searching cost and migration cost, the developer
might not want to migrate frequently. On the other hand, the construction worker is more likely
to look for jobs in nearby regions. Since he does not need to pay the long-distance searching
and migration cost, he might migrate more frequently.
2.3 Data and Variables
The analysis in this section mainly relies on the Integrated Public Use Microdata Survey
(IPUMS) by the U.S. Census from 1940-1960. Data with missing values are omitted. Co-
horts were chosen such that the CSL reform has a great inuence on their education outcome.
In the sample, the highest age is set to be 60 to reduce the bias caused by mortality. The sam-
ples were also restricted to people aged 25 or above to reduce the bias due to people re-locating
14
to nish their education in di¤erent schools.
In the baseline study, this paper only includes the white sample for two reasons. First,
according to Lleras-Muney (2002), CSLs have a similar e¤ect on white males and females, but
have no e¤ect on blacks. Secondly, blacks showed a drastically di¤erent migration pattern in
the early 20th century, which is commonly referred to as the Great Migration. Driven by harsh
segregationist laws, many blacks migrated from the rural south to the urban north during that
period, which is di¤erent than the whites. However, when all races are included, the results are
robust, only change slightly.
The present study focuses on migration between states, since the between-state movements
is more likely to be driven by employment opportunities or wage di¤erences (Niedomysl (2011)).
Also, only lifetime migration is observable in the census by comparing peoples birth states and
resident states during the survey. The variable of migration status is dened as a binary variable,
equal to 1 if state of birth is di¤erent from the state of residence at the census year, and equal
to 0 otherwise. (For simplicity, migration only refers to residing out of birth states hereinafter.)
The individual characteristic variables used in this analysis, such as age, sex, education, state
of birth and state of residence are directly extracted from the IPUMS.
In this paper, migration distance is proxied by the distance between birth state popula-
tion center and resident state population center. The distance is calculated using an accurate
ellipsoidal model of the Earth. The longitude of state population centers are obtained from
the Census Bureau. Since migrating to Hawaii and Alaska might show di¤erent patterns than
other U.S. states, this study excludes those individuals for simplicity. However, including the
two states will not change the results since only small amount of the population live there.
Table (2.1) and Table (2.2) list the summary statistics of the data. The sample average
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years of schooling is 10.2 years. Around 31% of the total population migrated at least once.
For those who migrated, the average migration distance is 694 miles, proximately the distance
between Chicago and New York City.
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Education (year) 634,656 10.2 3.3 0 18
Migration Distance (km) 196,795 694.4 642 29 3031.7
Migration Status 634,656 0.31 0.46 0 1
Female 634,656 0.5 0.5 0 1
Age 634,656 39.4 8.8 25 59
Note: Included cohort born between 1901 and 1925, white population.
Data Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Survey 1940-1960, U.S. Census Bureau
Since samples exposed to di¤erent CSL levels are very unequal (Table (2.2)), I divide CSLs
into 4 broad categories to be more balanced. The 4 categories are: 1) Low CSL (with 0,
4 and 5 years of CSL, constituting 5.7% of total sample); 2) CSL=6 (with 6 years of CSL,
31.13%); 3) CSL=7 (with 7 years of CSL, 46.96%); and 4) High CSL (with 8, 9 and 10 years
of CSL, 16.20%). As shown in Table (2.2), a majority of the states have compulsory schooling
requirement at either 6 or 7 years of education. The categorical CSL dened here will be used
as an alternative IV in the estimation, to supplement the results using linear CSL.
2.4 Identication Strategy and Specication
The main goal of the present study is to estimate the e¤ect of education on a persons migration
distance and probability. There is a long-standing belief that education is correlated with
many characteristics which also a¤ect migration, such as motivation, health, social networks,
or abilities. If a highly motivated individual is more likely to nish school, and to accept jobs
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of Compulsory Schooling Law
Compulsory Schooling Law (yr) Frequency Percentage (%)
CSL=0 7,929 1.28
CSL=4 17,927 2.88
CSL=5 7,405 1.19
CSL=6 190,282 30.62
CSL=7 295,241 47.51
CSL=8 54,597 8.79
CSL=9 19,541 3.14
CSL=10 28,541 4.59
Note: Included cohort born between 1901 and 1925, white population.
Data Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Survey 1940-1960, U.S. Census Bureau
that require relocation, one might suspect that the OLS is biased and will overestimate the
e¤ect of education. Reverse causality is another issue that can not be addressed by OLS. If
families move to seek better education for their children, OLS will overestimate the impact of
education. Lastly, measurement error in schooling might also introduce bias when using OLS.
But according to Angrist and Krueger (1991), the bias is relatively small. The present study
proposes to use exogenous education variation that is caused by Compulsory Schooling Law
(CSL) reform in the U.S. from 1915 to 1939 to control for these issues.
In this paper, I use state-level CSL changes from 1915 to 1939 as an instrument to study
how education a¤ects migration behavior. The rst CSL in the U.S. was passed in 1852 by the
Massachusetts General court in an attempt to transform education from a moral obligation into
a legal requirement. At the time, CSL requirements were mostly symbolic, lacking enforcement
mechanisms. Between 1900 and 1930, many states started enforcing the law more rigorously,
i.e. establishing attendance o¢ ces and institutionalizing school census to record studentsed-
ucation progress. At the same time, CSLs themselves were also changed from simple schooling
requirements into complex legal systems which also include child labor regulations. As a result,
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CSLs were more strictly followed during this period (Katz (1976)). After 1940, the importance
of CSLs were reduced since average education level increased steadily, hence the number of stu-
dents who would drop out school if without CSLs reduced (Edwards (1978)). In addition, the
reform of CSL was mainly driven by social forces at the time of passage, and hence were mostly
independent of state-wide economic conditions. These factors make CSL reforms a valid IV
for this time period due to its impact on child schooling and its independence from individual
characteristics.
The CSL variables are constructed following Lleras-Muney (2005). In the early 20th century,
child labor laws and compulsory schooling laws often were not coordinated (Lleras-Muney
(2002)). Lleras-Muney (2002) suggest that CSLs a¤ected schooling through three major aspects
of these laws: the age at which a child had to enter school (enterage), the age at which a child
could get a work permit to leave school and work (workage) and whether a state required a
child with a work permit to nish the schooling requirement by studying part-time. When
the school entrance age and the work permit age were enforced following CSL, the di¤erence
between these two ages represents the years that a child had to attend school. Following these
studies, the CSL variable is calculated by combining the age at which a child had to enter school
and the age required for a work permit, dened as CSL = workage   enterage. Currently,
most states require all students to start school at age 7 and permit them to work when older
than 16, so the e¤ective compulsory schooling would be 16  7 = 9 years.
Based on the variables dened above, this paper estimates the following 2SLS model. The
econometric specication is as following:
18
log(D)i = + Ei +Xi +Hs+ t + c + bs + trends + ui; (2.4)
mi = + Ei +Xi +Hs+ t + c + bs + trends + ui; (2.5)
with rst stage specied as below:
Ei = + CSLcs   +Xi+Hs+ t + c + bs + trends + i; (2.6)
In the equations above, log(D)i is the log migration distance measured in kilometers; mi
is the migration status dummy of an individual i: equal to 1 if is birth state s is di¤erent
from his resident state in census year t, and equal to 0 otherwise. The completed schooling
years are represented by Ei. Its coe¢ cient  is the center of estimation. Variable CSLcs is the
compulsory schooling requirement when a given individual is 14 years old for cohort c born in
state s, which serves as the excluded instrument. Vector Xi are individual characteristics which
are exogenous to unobservables at the individual level. Here I include gender, age and square
of age. Since the Census data from various waves are being pooled together, it is necessary to
include census year dummies t. Cohort xed e¤ect c is also included to control for nation-
wide shocks that a¤ect all states similarly. I also include birth state xed e¤ects bs to control for
state specic amenities. A state with pleasant weather or beautiful landscapes might attract
more highly educated people. Failing to control for state amenities might cause a spurious
correlation between education and migration.
Adding state-specic time variant variables are important to separate the e¤ect of improved
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education from other state trends. Many state-wide changes were occurring at the same time
with CSL increase and schooling improvement. One may argue that the e¤ects of increased
schooling on migration could simply reect the impact of those omitted state-level shocks. For
example, a prospering economy could both make education more a¤ordable to local govern-
ments and make the labor market more attractive and decrease out-migration simultaneously.
Omitting this confounding factor would underestimate the e¤ect of education on migration.
This model includes two sets of variables trends and Hs for this purposes. Variables trends are
linear birth state trends, constructed by using birth state dummies multiplied by birth year.
Hs are state-level characteristics at individual is birth state at age 14, which are non-linear
and time variant.
State-wide characteristic Hs are chosen to control state-wide economic and labor market
conditions that might a¤ect education and migration together. The variables include average
annual wage in the manufacturing industry, percentage of manufacturing employment of the
total population, average value of a farm per acre, number of doctors per capita, state expen-
ditures on education, the number of school buildings per acre, percentage of foreign born white
population, percentage of black population, and percentage of urban population. Each cohort
is matched with their birth-state characteristics including CSLs at the year when the cohort
reached age 14, as it is the lowest common drop out age across states. However, the results
show that excluding those variables does not a¤ect the main conclusion.
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2.5 OLS results
This section reports the OLS estimation results, which serve as the benchmark for comparison
with the IV results. The OLS results are consistent with previous literature, suggesting that
one additional year of education is associated with a 2.1% increase of migration distance and a
1.8% increase of the probability to migrate. These results are very robust when using di¤erent
subsamples.
Part 1 of Table (2.4) reports the results using log migration distance as a dependent variable.
The econometric model used for OLS estimation is summarized by Equation (2.4). Using
the entire white population, the results suggest one additional year of schooling will increase
travelling distance by 2.1%. The mean migration distance in this period is 694 miles. A 2.1%
increase indicates an extra 14 miles of moving distance, which is a quite small e¤ect.
Part 2 of Table (2.4) analyzes how education a¤ects the probability to migrate following
Equation (2.5). The estimated coe¢ cient of education is positive, statistically signicant and
robust to di¤erent sample choices and specications. When use the entire white sample, the
marginal e¤ect of education on migration is 1.8%, implying that one extra year of education
will increase the likelihood of migration by 1.8%. Since the mean migration rate for the entire
sample is only 32.5%, an 1.8% increase is not trivial. This e¤ect is consistent with many other
studies on both size and direction (Todaro (1980); Greenwood (1997)).
The OLS specication is robust to di¤erent specications and subsamples. Table (2.4) in-
cludes estimation results using three main subsamples. First of all, the Dust Bowl was a major
weather disaster that drove a large amount of the farm population to move in the 1930s. Col-
umn (2) reports the results excluding the main Dust Bowl-a¤ected states (Oklahoma, Kansas,
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Colorado and New Mexico). Secondly, since CSLs mainly a¤ect people with less education,
column (3) reports the results using only people with less than 12 years of schooling. Thirdly,
even though the First and Second World War did not happen on the American homeland,
they may have inuenced internal migration through the draft. Column (4) shows the results
with only male non-veterans. All above subsamples return very similar results. Table (2.5) re-
ports estimation using di¤erent specications. The estimator barely changed at all when using
di¤erent trends or state characteristics.
2.6 The E¤ect of Compulsory Schooling Laws on Education
2.6.1 Visual Evidence: The Survival Function of Schooling
Figure (2-1) not only provides visual evidence of the rst stage regression results, but also
provides some insight into how CSLs a¤ect educational distribution. Following Acemoglu and
Angrist (2001), each line displays the survival function of education under a particular CSL
minus the baseline distribution. The survival function of education is dened as 1-Cumulative
Distribution Function (SF = 1 CDF ). The baseline distribution is the survival function when
there was Low CSL, denoted as SFCSL=0;4;5. Intuitively, each line represents the di¤erence
between the rate of surviving certain grades when subject to a particular CSL and Low CSL.
For example, CSL=6 is dened as SFCSL=6   SFCSL=0;4;5. On line CSL=6, point (7, 13.2%)
means compared with people subject to Low CSL, people subject to 6 years of CSL are 13.2%
more likely to nish at least 7 years of education. Intuitively, the lines display the di¤erence
between groups a¤ected by di¤erent CSLs. Each point on the line represents the probability of
completing grades higher than grades on the x-axis compared with baseline distribution.
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Figure 2-1: Survival Function of Education by Severity of Compulsory Schooling Law
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Note: Each line represents the survival function of education distribution under di¤erent
Compulsory schooling law (CSL) compared with baseline distribution. The points on
each line represent the probability of complete grades higher than grades on x-axis
compared with when expose to low CSL requirement. CSLs are calculated at birth
state-level when individual is 14. Survival function of education is equal to 1-Cumulative
Distribution Function (SF = 1 CDF ). Baseline distribution is survival function when
there was low CSL, dened as SFCSL=0;4;5. The line CSL6 represents SFCSL=6  
SFCSL=0;4;5. The line High CSL is SFCSL>7   SFCSL=0;4;5.
Data Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Survey 1940-1960, U.S. Census Bureau
There are two features of the graph that support the choice of using CSL change as IV.
First of all, the survival rate of any grade increases with increased CSL. All the lines are above
0, meaning those who are exposed to CSL are more likely to survive any level of schooling than
those who are exposed to less than 6 years of CSL. Also, the lines are monotonically shifting
up as CSLs increase. For example, CSL=7 is signicantly above the CSL=6 line, especially
between 4-12 grades, even though they have similar shapes. This implies that people living
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in areas with 7 years of CSL requirement were much more likely to complete grade 4-12 than
those who live in areas with 6 years of CSL. Overall, gure (2-1) demonstrates that the higher
the CSL, the higher the probability of completing certain grades. This observation is consistent
with the rst stage result in table (2.3) when using broad CSL categories.
The second feature is that the survival rate di¤erence increases as schooling increases, then
drops drastically after grade 12. The trend implies that the main impact of CSL was on
peoples middle- and high-school education. Also, the gure suggests the problem of omitted
variables such as macroeconomics conditions or preferences for schooling across states might
not be correlated with CSL. The reason for this is that if they are highly correlated, since those
omitted variables are also correlated with the likelihood of college education, then a stricter
CSL should be associated with a higher chance of nishing collage. That is not the case here
since the impact of CSLs on schooling dropped sharply after grade 12.
2.6.2 The Impact of Compulsory Schooling Laws on State Education
To show the association between state level education and the change of CSLs, Figure (2-2)
plots changes in state average education between cohorts born in 1901 and 1925 against the
changes in CSLs between 1915 and 1939. The dash line is the tted line of the entire sample,
with a slope of 0.07. The positive slope implies a positive e¤ect of CSLs on education. The
solid line is the tted line that excludes states with CSLs that increased more than 7 years,
with a slope of 0.113. Those states are mainly southern states with less educated people. The
solid line also slopes upward but is steeper than the dash line. The slope di¤erence indicates
that the excluded southern states atten the slope, with a large increase of CSLs but only a
moderate increase of education. If we treat states with more than 7 years of CSL increment
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as outliers and drop them, we will observe an even larger e¤ect of CSLs on education, which
indicates that the positive e¤ect of CSLs is not driven by some particular states.
Figure 2-2: The Impact of CSL Change on Education Improvement: Cohort 1901-1925
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Notes: The change of state average education is calculated using cohorts born in 1901
and 1925. The changes of CSLs are between 1915 and 1939. Sample contain only white
population and states that experienced CSL changes. The dash line is the tted line of
the entire sample. The solid line is the tted line of the subsample that excludes states
with CSLs that increased more than 7 years.
Data Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Survey 1940-1960, U.S. Census Bureau
2.6.3 First Stage: The E¤ect of Compulsory Schooling Laws on Education
Consistent with visual evidence in Figure (2-1) and Figure (2-2), the OLS estimator suggests
that CSLs do have a statistically signicant inuence on educational attainment. Table (2.3)
summarizes the rst stage results following Equation (2.6). The coe¢ cient of interest is the
e¤ect of CSLs, which is positive, statistically signicant, robust to di¤erent sample choices
and relatively small. Using the entire white sample, the results indicate that one extra year
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of compulsory schooling requirement when a person was 14 would increase that persons total
schooling by 0.027 years. Lleras-Muney (2005) estimated the impact of CSLs on education
to be 0.046, which is also positive but with twice the magnitude. The results di¤er because
the present study includes more control variables, i.e. age and race dummies, and uses birth
state trends instead of regional trends. Since each region contains several states, using regional
trends might not be able to separate state-specic developments from the CSL increments, and
hence would overestimate the e¤ect. Using state trends and adding the additional controls
signicantly reduces the magnitude but reects a cleaner e¤ect of CSLs. In addition to OLS
results discussed above, the rst stage F-statistics are all statistically signicant, rejecting the
weak IV assumption. This result could alleviate concerns that states passed CSLs when they
were no longer binding, or states did not enforce them strictly. If that were the case, the
weak correlation between CSLs and completed schooling years would lead to an inconsistent
estimation in the second stage.
2.7 The Impact of Education on Migration
2.7.1 The Impact of Education on Migration Distance
This section presents the empirical results, suggesting that education increases peoples migra-
tion distance. The reduced form results indicate a direct positive correlation between CSLs
and distance. The 2SLS estimator suggests the marginal e¤ect of education is to increase dis-
tance by 23%. The positive impact of education could be consistently observed using various
specications and subsamples.
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Reduced Form Estimation
Figure 2-3: E¤ect of Compulsory Schooling Law on Migration Distance
-.0
2
-.0
1
0
.0
1
.0
2
Av
er
ag
e 
Lo
g 
M
ig
ra
tio
n 
D
ist
an
ce
 (k
m
)
0 2 4 6 8 10
Compulsory Schooling Law
Notes: Figure is drawn using the white sample born between 1901 and 1925 in the U.S.,
who lived outside of their birth state. Dots are average log migration distance for each
CSL with the e¤ect of cohort, birth state and birth state trend taken out. The solid
line is the tted line of the entire sample.
Data Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Survey 1940-1960, U.S. Census Bureau
The reduced form estimators in Table (2.3) suggest that one extra year of compulsory
schooling requirement is associated with 3% greater migration distance when use the white
migrants born between 1901 and 1925 in the U.S. as the sample. The tted line in Figure (2-3)
is the visual display of the association, which slopes upward after controlling for cohort, birth
state and birth state trend e¤ects. When using categorical CSL as IV, the omitted category is
CSL that require less than 6 years of education. Compared with this, CSL that require 7 years
of education or above increase peoples migration distance. The only exception are CSLs that
require 6 years of education, which reduce migration distance by 9.5%. The negative e¤ect is
mostly driven by the migrants subject to 5 years of CSL. Since those migrants only constitute
1.19% of the total sample, their greater average distance might be an outlier (Table (2.2)).
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2SLS Results
Both OLS and 2SLS results in Table (2.4) show that education increases migration distance.
However, 2SLS results indicate an impact that is 10 times larger (0.233 v.s. 0.021), suggesting
that an additional year of schooling increases migration distance by 23.3% for individuals who
migrated. This e¤ect is quite large. Since the average migration distance is 694 miles, a 23.3%
increment means moving an additional 162 miles, which is roughly the distance between New
York City and Boston.
This paper also uses a di¤erent specication of CSLs to test the robustness of the results. As
discussed before, CSLs are divided into four broad categories: Low CSL (CSL=0, 4, 5), CSL=6,
CSL=7, and High CSL (CSL=8, 9, 10). When using these categorical dummy variables as IV,
the results are very similar to the baseline results (column (6)). The magnitude of the e¤ect
decreases slightly, from 23.3% to 21.8%, and the standard deviation also decreases which leads
to a tighter estimation.
Additionally, Table (2.4) reports three robustness tests results using di¤erent subsamples.
Excluding the main Dust Bowl-a¤ected states decreases the estimated e¤ect slightly, from 23.3%
to 17%, indicating that education has a larger impact on those states. Other robustness tests,
such as excluding the sample with more than 12 years of education or excluding females and
veterans, consistently suggest a positive e¤ect of education on migration distance. Though not
reported in the main table, excluding California residents also suggests a positive impact. Based
on total inow of migrants, California is the most popular destination state in the U.S. before
1940. It attracted more than twice the number of migrants as the second popular state New
York. Approximately 3.6 million migrants reside in California in 1940, which constitutes 15.4%
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of total migrants in the U.S.. Due to its specialty, a robustness test is done by excluding all
the California residents, and the estimated impact is positive but not statistically signicant.
Based on the conceptual framework, the positive impact of education on distance indicates
an increasing return to distance when people become more educated. One possible reason is
that jobs for highly-educated workers are more disperse than jobs for less-educated workers,
hence searching a longer distance is more benecial for the highly-educated workers. If the
marginal cost of distance is similar for both types of workers, then the highly-educated workers
would migrate longer distances on average.
2.7.2 The Impact of Education on Probability of Migration
This section shows that education decreases peoples probability of migration and makes them
more stable when using CSL as IV. 2SLS results suggest that one additional year of schooling
decreases the migration probability by 6.6%. The result is robust under di¤erent specications
and using di¤erent subsamples.
Reduced Form Estimation
Table (2.3) displays the reduced form estimation and suggests that one extra year of CSL
requirement decreases the probability of migration by 0.2% (column (5)). The tted line in
Figure (2-4) visually displays the negative correlation, which slopes downward after controlling
for cohort, birth states, and birth state trends. The results using CSL categories as explanatory
variables suggest that CSLs are negatively correlated with migration probability only when
states require 7 years of schooling or above. Figure (2-4) suggests that this is mostly because
individuals subject to 4 years of CSL have low probability of migration.
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Figure 2-4: E¤ect of Compulsory Schooling Law on Probability of Migration
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Notes: Figure is drawn using the entire whites sample born between 1901 and 1925 in
the U.S.. Dots are average probability of migration for each CSL with cohort, birth
state and birth state trend e¤ects taken out. Solid line is the tted line.
Data Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Survey 1940-1960, U.S. Census Bureau
2SLS Results
When comparing OLS and 2SLS results in Table (2.4), the coe¢ cients not only have di¤erent
magnitudes but also have opposite signs. The baseline includes the entire white sample. The
OLS estimator shows 1 more year of education is associated with a 1.8% higher probability of
migration (column (5)). In contrast, the 2SLS estimator indicates that one additional year of
education decreases the probability of migration by 6.6%. When using categorical CSL as IV,
results are very similar, showing that the marginal e¤ect of education is -7.4% (column (6)). If
we focus on the population with less than 12 years of education, the di¤erence between OLS
and 2SLS is slightly larger. The OLS estimator suggests the correlation is 1.4%, while the 2SLS
estimator suggests the e¤ect is -7.2%. According to the conceptual framework, the estimated
negative impact suggests there might be a substantial marginal cost of migration distance,
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Figure 2-5: E¤ect of Compulsory Schooling Law on Probability of Migration:By States
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Notes: Figure is drawn using the entire whites sample born between 1901 and 1925 in
the U.S.. Dots are average probability of migration against the change of compulsory
schooling laws for each states. Solid line is the tted line.
Data Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Survey 1940-1960, U.S. Census Bureau
especially considering the poor transportation and communication system in the early 20th
century.
To see whether the results are driven by particular events during 1915-1960, two robustness
tests are done. First, weather disasters like Dust Bowls have large impacts on poor and low ed-
ucated people, hence they might cause a negative correlation between education and migration.
After excluding main Dust Bowl a¤ected states, the estimator is still negative, only changed
slightly, from -6.6% to -6.3% (column (7)). This indicates that the disaster induced migration
could not explain why lower educated people are more likely to move. Secondly, veterans are
usually more mobile than non-veterans. In the data, they are also more educated on average.
Restricting the sample to only men who are non-veterans, the OLS result is almost identical.
However, since the sample size is greatly reduced by more than 60%, the 2SLS result is no
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longer signicant (column (9)). However, the point estimator is still negative and very close to
the baseline results.
Is the Impact of Education U-shaped?
Since Figure (2-1) implies that CSLs mainly a¤ect people with 12 years of education or under,
it is natural to ask whether the di¤erence between OLS and IV estimation simply reect the
di¤erence between average treatment e¤ect and local treatment e¤ect. Imagine when the impact
of education is "U-shaped," decreasing at rst then increasing when education increases. If this
is the case, it is possible that OLS estimation with a large portion of a highly educated sample
shows a positive e¤ect of education on migration, since the average treatment e¤ect could be
positive due to the upward sloping area. And when using CSL as IV, 2SLS results, which
estimate the local treatment e¤ect, are negative due to the downward sloping area at the low
end of education distribution.
Figure (2-6) suggests that the di¤erence between average treatment e¤ect and local treat-
ment e¤ect could not explain the observed di¤erence between OLS and IV estimation. Figure
(2-6) is drawn with the coe¢ cients obtained from OLS estimation of Equation (2.5) using cat-
egorical years of education as explanatory variables instead of total years of education. The
omitted variable is the dummy variable representing no formal schooling, which serve as base-
line e¤ect. The coe¢ cients of other categorical schooling years imply how achieving certain
years of education changes the probability of migration compared with no education at all. The
estimated coe¢ cients are plotted in Figure (2-6), which shows clearly that people with higher
education level are always more likely to migrate when using OLS. The only exception is when
people increase their schooling from 3 to 4 years, their migration likelihood decreases by 0.002,
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however, this di¤erence is statistically insignicant. In conclusion, the di¤erence between OLS
and 2SLS is consistent using di¤erent subsamples, and is not caused by local treatment e¤ect.
Figure 2-6: E¤ect of Categorical Education on Migration: OLS Estimation
Note: This gure displays the coe¢ cients of categorical education attainment from
OLS estimation of Equation (2.5) using categorical schooling instead of total years of
education as Ei.
Data Source: IPUMS 1940-1960, U.S. Census Bureau
2.7.3 Alternative Specication
Recently, several papers have pointed out that including a location specic time trend will
drastically alter the results when using state schooling requirement change as IV. Because when
using CSL as an IV, the identication is from the variation of policy changes within the state
which a¤ect di¤erent cohorts. As state policy, compulsory schooling reforms might coincide with
other locational trends such as the change of economic or labor market conditions, and other
social reforms. Hence, it is important to include location specic time trends to separate the
e¤ect of increased schooling requirements from birth place trends. Mazumder (2008) suggests
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that ignoring state trends tends to overestimate the impact of education on health outcomes,
and hence, causal interpretation of the results is unwarranted. Stephens and Yang (2014) also
suggest that including regional time trend will eliminate some observed e¤ects or alter the
sign of the e¤ect of education on personal outcomes. The reason why adding time trends will
change the results drastically remains unclear. Their suggestion is to split the sample and test
the robustness of the results. Although not reported in the table, the main results hold when
all the southern states are excluded as a robustness test.
The results in this paper suggest that using detailed time trends is important when using
CSL as an IV, but has limited inuence on the OLS results. Table (2.5) reports the estimation
results when di¤erent birth place trends specications are used. The estimated e¤ects of educa-
tion on migration outcomes are almost identical under di¤erent specications when using OLS
estimation. On the other hand, the point estimators using 2SLS suggest that location trends
signicantly a¤ect the estimated e¤ect of education. The di¤erent e¤ects of locational trends
when using OLS and 2SLS might indicate that the locational trend is particularly important
to identify the e¤ect of CSLs in the rst stage. Regional trends show no particular power in
improving the identication of the impact of education, suggesting that it is not able to fully
separate the inuence of state development.
While it is not reported in the main table, analysis has also been done using samples that
are younger than 18. The OLS estimators are statistically signicant at 1% level, suggesting
that 1 year of education is associated with a 0.9% higher probability to migrate and a 4.2%
longer migration distance if they decided to move. The 2SLS estimators are much less precise
due to the restricted sample size. None of the estimator is statistically signicant at 10% level,
but the sign of the point estimator is consistent as before, suggesting that education causes
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people to migrate further away from their birth place, but reduces their likelihood to move5.
The results suggest that we could not rule out the possibility that families migrate for better
education since a higher CSL reduces the migration likelihood for those who were under 18.
2.8 Using Quarter of Birth as Instrument Variables
This section presents results when using quarter of birth as an alternative IV to estimate
the e¤ect of education on migration. This identication strategy is well-founded and easy to
understand. Angrist and Krueger (1991) were the rst to point out that seasons of birth are
related to education attainment due to the school starting age policy and compulsory schooling
laws. Most school districts require a child to have turned 6 years of age by January 1st of the
year in which she/he enters school. Hence, individuals who are born at the beginning of the
year start school slightly older than those born at the end of the year. Most states also require
students to remain in school until they turn 16 or 17. Those who are born in the early months
of the year could legally leave school with less education since they are older compared with
other students in the same grade. After establishing the impact of birth date on schooling,
Angrist and Krueger (1991) then utilized the education variation caused by birth date as an IV
to identify the e¤ect of schooling on future earnings.
Since then, many studies have been done to discuss the validity of the method. One main
critique of the original method is that ones quarter of birth is only weakly correlated with
their education outcomes (Bound et al. (1995)). It is well known that when the instruments
are weakly correlated with the endogenous variable, 2SLS can be severely biased (Rothen-
5The point estimator and variance of the e¤ect of education is 77.3% and 0.883 when using migration distance
as dependent variable; and -4.8% and 0.135 when using migration probability as dependent variable.
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berg (1984)). Staiger and Stock (1997) suggests that limited information maximum likelihood
(LIML) estimation is less biased than 2SLS in the existence of weak instrument, particularly
when there is only one endogenous variable. Anderson and Rubin (1949) proposed a test of
structural parameters (the AR test) that has the correct size under a wide variety of violations
of the standard assumptions of IV regression, including under weak instrument conditions. In
this section, I present estimation results from OLS, 2SLS and LIML results, using AR test as
a robustness test when using LIML estimation.
The main specication, which directly follows Angrist and Krueger (1991), is presented in
the following equations:
Ei = Xi +
P
c Yicc +
P
c
P
j YicQijjc + ui
mig_outcomesi = Xi +
P
c Yicc + Ei + i
In the above equations, Ei is education of individual i measured in years. Qij are dummy
variables indicating whether the individual was born in quarter j (j = 1; 2; 3): Fixed e¤ect for
the rst quarter of birth Qi0 is used as the baseline and is thus omitted in the regression. Yic
are dummy variables indicating whether the individual was born in year c (c = 1; :::; 10). Xi are
vector of covariates including age (detailed to quarters), square of age and gender, cohort xed
e¤ect, state xed e¤ect and state trends. jc is the xed e¤ect of being born in year c and
quarter j compared with being born in year c but in the rst quarter. Instead of assuming
a similar e¤ect of quarter of birth for all cohorts, this specication allows the e¤ect to di¤er
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among the cohorts, and hence more exible.
Using quarter of birth as an IV, the results in Table (2.6) are di¤erent compared with using
CSL to estimate the e¤ect of education on peoples probability of migration. There could be
several reasons behind this. First of all, weak IV might bias the results when using quarter of
birth even though LIML is used and Anderson Rubin test is done. Secondly, as a state policy,
CSL not only a¤ects education at the individual level, but also a¤ect education at the state
level. Increased average education at the state level might also increase state amenities, hence
encouraging people to stay. On the contrary, quarter of birth will not have that e¤ect.
2.9 Discussion
The main conclusion of this paper is that education does have a signicant impact on migration
outcomes. Compared with other studies, the OLS results are quite similar, which indicate that
one additional year of education is associated with a 1.8% higher probability to migrate and
2.1% greater distance of that migration (Greenwood (1997)). Using state CSL reforms as an
IV, this paper suggests the causal impact of education on migration distance is 23.3%, which
is in the same direction but much larger than the OLS results. However, using the same
IV, this paper also reports a negative point estimator of the impact of education on migration
probability, which suggests that the marginal e¤ect of schooling is to reduce peoples probability
to migrate by 6.6%. These results are similar to McHenrys (2013), in which negative impact
of education on both lifetime and 5 year migration probability is reported using a similar
identication. However, other studies suggest di¤erent e¤ects using various identications.
For example, Malamud and Wozniak (2012) reports that an additional year of postsecondary
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schooling increases probability of migration by around 9%, using variation in college attainment
due to draft-avoidance behavior during the Vietnam War. One main di¤erence between this
study and theirs is that the reforms used here a¤ect primarily the lower part of the educational
distribution, while the draft-avoidance in their paper mainly a¤ects college education. This
could be one of the reasons why our results di¤er.
The drastic di¤erence between OLS and 2SLS result shows that it is important to treat
endogenous unobservables when study the e¤ect of education, since omitted variables such
as ability could lead to largely biased results. For example, assume that compared with low
educated worker, the social network of high educated worker makes it easier for them to nd
new jobs, but also result in a higher loss if they move away from their network. If this is
the case, then the unobserved social network will increase the chance of migration but reduce
their incentive to move far away. Without controlling it, OLS will overestimate the e¤ect of
education on migration but underestimate the e¤ect of education on distance.
Several policy implications may be derived from the results. First of all, the e¤ect of a local
educational program on migration is theoretically indeterminate, and the results question the
conventional idea that more education would necessarily lead to more out-migration of highly-
educated workers, which is loosely referred to as "brain drain" (Beine et al. (2001)). This
paper suggests that under certain conditions, education could make people more stable. At the
state level, to determine the optimal investment on education, the government should consider
how it would a¤ect local economy. Knowing the migration e¤ect of education would allow us
to accurately estimate the return of education program. Secondly, the ability to migrate to
a suitable location with better job o¤ers and neighborhood amenities is essential for peoples
well-being. When evaluating the overall e¤ect of education at the individual level, we should
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also consider its inuence on geographic mobility. The results suggest that more education
leads to a broader migration distance hence more location choices.
The policy implications should be viewed with caution. First of all, as pointed out by Im-
bens and Angrist (1994), the e¤ect estimated using IV are a local average treatment e¤ect,
which represents the e¤ect on the binding population only. Those who are pushed into more
education by compulsory schooling laws might be di¤erent than the whole population. Second,
the cohorts studied in this paper are historical cohorts in the early 20th century, which resem-
ble the developing world more than the modern developed world. To draw inference for the
developed world, more recent instrument variables are needed.
To improve our understanding of the decision making process of migration, more research
need to be done. This paper mainly focuses at the individual level. The model suggests that
the negative impact of education on migration probability indicates a high marginal cost of
migration distance. However, this paper could not rule out other potential mechanisms. For
example, state CSL reforms not only a¤ect individual schooling, but also a¤ect the average
education level in a state. An improved average education level might make a state more
attractive to highly educated workers, hence making them more stable. This group e¤ect
could be regarded as one of the external e¤ects of education, which are essentially inseparables
when using state policy as IV. Since CSL reform binds a relatively small portion of the total
population, this paper chose to focus on individual e¤ect and overlook the general equilibrium
e¤ect.
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Table 2.3: The E¤ect of CSLs:First Stage and Reduced Form Results
First Stage Reduced Form
Dependent Variable: Schooling Years Log Migration Distance Migration Probability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Linear Categ. Linear Categ. Linear Categ.
CSL requirement 0.027*** 0.030*** -0.002**
(0.006) (0.002) (0.001)
CSL=6 0.088*** -0.095*** 0.001
(0.030) (0.010) (0.004)
CSL=7 0.128*** 0.055*** -0.008*
(0.032) (0.010) (0.005)
High CSL 0.187*** 0.099*** -0.010*
(0.037) (0.011) (0.005)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-level Controls Yes Yes No No No No
Birthyear Dummy Yes Yes No No No No
Birth State Dummy Yes Yes No No No No
Census Year Dummy Yes Yes No No No No
State Dummy*Cohort Yes Yes No No No No
F Statistics for Weak IV 34.976 90.388
N 634656 634656 196795 196795 634656 634656
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Note: The rst and second columns present the rst stage estimation following Equation (2.6) using
CSL and CSL categories. The remaining columns present the reduced form estimation with migration
distance and probability as dependent variables. In those columns, the control variables are gender, age
and age squared. All estimations use the white sample born between 1901 and 1925.
Data Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Survey, 1940-1960, U.S. Census Bureau
40
T
ab
le
2.
4:
T
he
e¤
ec
t
of
E
du
ca
ti
on
on
M
ig
ra
ti
on
:
O
L
S
an
d
2S
L
S
es
ti
m
at
io
n
re
su
lt
s
M
ig
ra
ti
on
D
is
ta
nc
e
O
L
S
2S
L
S
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
W
hi
te
N
o
D
B
L
ow
E
du
M
al
e
no
n
V
et
W
hi
te
C
SL
C
at
eg
.
N
o
D
B
L
ow
E
du
M
al
e
no
n
V
et
E
du
ca
ti
on
(y
r)
0.
02
1*
**
0.
02
3*
**
0.
02
9*
**
0.
02
3*
**
0.
23
3*
0.
21
8*
*
0.
17
0*
0.
16
7
0.
22
3
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.1
27
)
(0
.1
01
)
(0
.1
01
)
(0
.1
14
)
(0
.1
90
)
F
St
at
is
ti
cs
34
.9
76
12
.6
89
37
.2
03
27
.0
49
7.
02
N
19
67
95
18
66
15
15
07
14
60
49
3
19
67
95
19
67
95
18
66
15
15
07
14
60
49
3
M
ig
ra
ti
on
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
O
L
S
2S
L
S
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
W
hi
te
N
o
D
B
L
ow
E
du
M
al
e
no
n
V
et
W
hi
te
C
SL
C
at
eg
.
N
o
D
B
L
ow
E
du
M
al
e
no
n
V
et
E
du
ca
ti
on
(y
r)
0.
01
8*
**
0.
01
8*
**
0.
01
4*
**
0.
01
8*
**
-0
.0
66
*
-0
.0
74
**
-0
.0
63
*
-0
.0
72
*
-0
.0
89
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
35
)
(0
.0
32
)
(0
.0
33
)
(0
.0
38
)
(0
.0
57
)
F
St
at
is
ti
cs
90
.3
88
36
.1
77
95
.7
66
82
.7
77
24
.7
91
N
63
46
56
61
68
80
52
27
96
20
55
40
63
46
56
63
46
56
61
68
80
52
27
96
20
55
40
In
cl
ud
ed
C
on
tr
ol
V
ar
ia
bl
es
:
C
on
st
an
t,
In
di
vi
du
al
C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
,
St
at
e-
le
ve
l
C
on
tr
ol
s,
B
ir
th
St
at
e
F
ix
ed
E
¤
ec
t,
B
ir
th
Y
ea
r
F
ix
ed
E
¤
ec
t,
B
ir
th
St
at
e
D
um
m
y*
C
oh
or
t
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
*
p<
0.
10
;
**
p<
0.
05
;
**
*
p<
0.
01
N
ot
e:
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
pr
es
en
t
th
e
O
L
S
an
d
2S
L
S
es
ti
m
at
io
n
re
su
lt
s
fo
llo
w
in
g
E
qu
at
io
n
(2
.4
)
an
d
(2
.5
),
w
it
h
r
st
st
ag
e
es
ti
m
at
io
n
fo
llo
w
in
g
E
qu
at
io
n
(2
.6
).
A
ll
sp
ec
i
ca
ti
on
s
in
cl
ud
e
bi
rt
h
ye
ar
du
m
m
y,
bi
rt
h
st
at
e
du
m
m
y
an
d
ce
ns
us
ye
ar
du
m
m
y.
F
ir
st
pa
rt
of
th
e
ta
bl
e
us
e
lo
g
m
ig
ra
ti
on
di
st
an
ce
as
de
p
en
de
nt
va
ri
ab
le
.
T
he
se
co
nd
pa
rt
of
th
e
ta
bl
e
us
e
m
ig
ra
ti
on
du
m
m
y
as
de
p
en
de
nt
va
ri
ab
le
.
T
ho
ug
h
no
t
re
p
or
te
d
in
de
ta
il,
al
l
of
th
e
es
ti
m
at
io
ns
in
cl
ud
e
p
er
so
na
l
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s,
st
at
e-
le
ve
l
co
nt
ro
l
va
ri
ab
le
s
lis
te
d
in
pr
ev
io
us
se
ct
io
ns
,
bi
rt
h
ye
ar
du
m
m
ie
s,
bi
rt
h
st
at
e
du
m
m
ie
s
an
d
bi
rt
h
st
at
e
tr
en
d.
T
he
W
hi
te
co
lu
m
n
re
p
or
t
th
e
re
su
lt
s
us
in
g
th
e
en
ti
re
w
hi
te
p
op
ul
at
io
n
w
it
hi
n
C
en
su
s
19
40
-1
96
0
b
or
n
b
et
w
ee
n
19
01
to
19
25
.
D
i¤
er
en
t
su
bs
am
pl
es
an
d
di
¤
er
en
t
IV
sp
ec
i
ca
ti
on
ha
ve
b
ee
n
us
ed
in
fo
llo
w
in
g
co
lu
m
ns
to
te
st
th
e
ro
bu
st
ne
ss
:
th
e
N
oD
B
co
lu
m
n
ex
cl
ud
e
in
di
vi
du
al
s
b
or
n
in
O
kl
ah
om
a;
th
e
L
ow
E
du
co
lu
m
n
ex
cl
ud
e
in
di
vi
du
al
s
w
it
h
m
or
e
th
an
12
ye
ar
s
ed
uc
at
io
n;
th
e
M
al
e
no
n
V
et
co
lu
m
n
ex
cl
ud
e
fe
m
al
e
an
d
ve
te
ra
ns
;
th
e
C
SL
C
at
eg
.
co
lu
m
n
us
e
br
oa
d
C
SL
ca
te
go
ri
es
de
n
ed
in
se
ct
io
n
7
as
IV
in
st
ea
d
of
lin
ea
r
C
SL
va
ri
ab
le
.
D
at
a
So
ur
ce
:
In
te
gr
at
ed
P
ub
lic
U
se
M
ic
ro
da
ta
Su
rv
ey
19
40
-1
96
0,
U
.S
.
C
en
su
s
B
ur
ea
u.
41
Table 2.5: Results using Alternative Specication of State Trend
Specication: State Regional No No State Cohort*Region
Trend Trend Trend Characteristic Fixed e¤ect
Migration Distance
OLS
Education (yr) 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.021***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
2SLS
Education (yr) 0.233* 0.093 0.092 0.038 -0.024
(0.127) (0.060) (0.060) (0.053) (0.720)
N 196795 196795 196795 196795 196795
Migration Probability
OLS
Education (yr) 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
2SLS
Education (yr) -0.066* -0.028 -0.045** -0.163*** -0.003
(0.035) (0.020) (0.022) (0.050) (0.018)
N 634656 634656 634656 634656 634656
Included Control Variables:
Cohort
Fixed E¤ect Yes Yes Yes Yes No
State
Characteristics Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Note: This table presents the OLS and 2SLS estimation results following Equation (2.4) and Equation
(2.5), with rst stage estimation following Equation (2.6). Though not reported in detail, all of the
estimations include constant, age, age square, gender, birth state dummies and census wave dummies.
This table use sample contains the white population born between 1901 and 1925 in the U.S.. When
using log migration distance as dependent variable, only individuals who have migrated are included.
Column (StateTrend) includes linear time trend of each state, which is used in previous sections. Column
(Regional Trend) uses time trends of 4 census region. Column (No Trend) doesnt contain any location
variable time trend. Column (No State Characteristics) uses state linear trend but doesnt contain
state-wide variables such as average annual wage in the manufacturing industry, percent of manufacture
employment of total population, etc. Column (Cohort*Region Fixed E¤ect) drops cohort xed e¤ect,
but add region specic cohort xed e¤ect, allows cohort xed e¤ect to di¤er at di¤erent regions.
Data Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Survey, 1940-1960, U.S. Census Bureau
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Chapter 3
The Heterogeneous E¤ect of
Immigration on Housing Price
3.1 Introduction
Housing price is crucial to peoples well-being. It not only a¤ects their living conditions, but
also a¤ects the homeownerswealth. Only recently, did researchers begin to analyze how immi-
gration a¤ects the price of this particular commodity (Saiz (2003); Saiz and Wachter (2011)).
However, those studies are mostly focused on the average e¤ect, ignoring existing neighborhood
heterogeneity. In this paper, we propose to use quantile regression to analyze how immigration
a¤ects di¤erent types of neighborhoods in the housing market. In other words, we not only
ask the question, "Does immigration matter?", but we also ask the question, "For whom does
immigration matter?" (Eide and Showalter (1998)).
Previous literature analyzing immigration impacts has focused mainly on the displacement
e¤ects in the labor market. Kerr and Kerr (2011) provide a comprehensive survey of recent
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empirical studies on the economic impact of immigration. Using U.S. data, many studies
(Card (1990); Altonji and Card (1991); Longhi et al (2006); Peri (2007)) nd that both the
wage and employment displacement e¤ects are very small when using various identication
strategies. More recent studies also attempt to estimate how immigrants a¤ect the prices of
various commodities. Saiz (2003, 2007) are the rst to show that US housing prices rise with
immigration at the city level. On the other hand, Saiz and Wachter (2011) pointed out that
U.S. housing prices decrease with immigration at the census tract level. These di¤erent results
show that there is large spatial heterogeneities within a city, and simply estimating the average
e¤ect will overlook the most interesting within-city dynamics. To analyze the neighborhood
heterogeneous e¤ect of immigration directly, we use quantile regression.
The obvious advantages of using quantile regression is that it can estimate the e¤ect of
immigration on the whole conditional distribution of housing price, and it is less a¤ected by
outliers. Using ordinary least square (OLS) and instrumental variable (IV) estimation, the
results suggest that immigrants have a very limited e¤ect on the local housing prices on average.
However, both quantile regression (QR) and the two stage quantile regression (2SQR) suggest
that at both higher and lower tails of the housing price distribution, immigrants have signicant
and heterogeneous e¤ects on the housing price. For example, when using the pull e¤ect of
existing immigrants as an IV, the 2SQR suggests that a 1% increase of foreign-born in the
neighborhood will increase the housing price by 1% at the 80th percentile while decreasing
the housing price by 1.3% at the 20th percentile. This paper also looks at potential channels
through which immigrants a¤ect housing prices in di¤erent neighborhoods. The results suggest
that neighborhoods react di¤erently when immigrants move in at both the demand and supply
side of the housing market.
45
The welfare implications of our results are complicated. A decrease in housing price implies
that the housing is more a¤ordable for renters, but it also means homeowners are losing their
wealth. As pointed out in the previous literature, people who are more likely to be credit-
constrained and older homeowners, who are likely to be trading downon their housing stock,
are the ones whose daily consumption is mostly a¤ected by housing price changes (Calomiris
et al (2012)). Hence, the adverse e¤ect that immigrants have on poor neighborhoods could
potentially bring about large negative welfare implications.
3.2 Data
The empirical analysis in this paper is based on the decennial Neighborhood Change Database
from 1970 to 2000, which contains housing price and demographic information at the census
tract level. Census tract is a small geographic unit, with a population of less than 4000 on
average. In comparison, the more commonly used Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) has
more than a 0.9 million population on average. Using MSA as the unit of analysis could
uncover the average e¤ect of immigration at the city level, but would overlook interesting
changes happening within a city. Using census tract instead will allow us to look inside each
MSA and understand the e¤ects of immigration on di¤erent neighborhoods within a city.
The Neighborhood Change Database allows us to access the decennial U.S. Census data
with the geographic boundaries normalized to the 2010 boundaries. With the census tract
boundaries normalized, we are able to study how neighborhoods evolve over time within the
same boundary denition, and hence makes the historic comparison more accurate. Note that
some areas, especially some rural areas, were not tracted in 1970 and 1980. Hence no data is
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available for those years. Specically, around 40% of the 2010 census tracts are missing for 1970
and 24% are missing in 1980. Those census tracts, along with the ones with zero population
or zero housing prices are dropped from the analysis. We did not include data from year 2010
census to avoid the subprime mortgage crisis which started in 2007; even though it is available.
All MSAs are included in this analysis, unlike Saiz and Wachter (2011), who only included
the MSAs with substantial immigration population. The MSAs that have low immigrant pop-
ulation could still have neighborhoods that are heavily a¤ected by immigrants. Hence, they
should be included in our study. Summary statistics in Table (3.1) show that the average
ination adjusted housing price has increased almost seven times in three decades, from 22.2
thousands in 1970 to 155 thousands in 2000. At the same time, the average foreign-born popula-
tion more than tripled, indicating a positive time trend for both housing price and immigration.
Among all the foreign born populations, the proportion with Mexican origin increased more
than three times.
3.3 Quantile Regression and Heterogeneity
3.3.1 OLS and IV
Studies analyzing the immigration e¤ects have primarily relied on estimation approaches such
as Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) or Instrumental Variables (IV), which estimate the average
e¤ects of immigration on neighborhood housing prices. While less robust, understanding how
immigration a¤ects neighborhoods on average could still provide a useful insights. Hence,
we start our analysis with conventional OLS and IV estimation as a benchmark. The OLS
estimation is specied as below:
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 log(price)it = + 1imm_shareit 1 + Tract
0
it2 + Y eart +MSAi + it: (3.1)
where  log(price)it is the change of log housing price for census tract i from period t 1 to
t. Taking the rst di¤erence of the housing price eliminates census tract xed e¤ects, controlling
for time invariant factors such as the climate, history or location of the census track. To control
for reverse causality issue, lagged change of immigration population is used, which is dened as
immi_shareit 1; the change of immigrant population between t  2 and t  1 divided by the
total population in that census tract at t   1. The coe¢ cient 1 is the parameter of interest.
A positive value would imply that neighborhoods that are becoming more immigrant dense are
the same ones that experience faster housing value appreciation. An alternative way would be
to use the total immigrant population as an independent variable, which could reveal the overall
e¤ect of the inow of immigrants, including both the e¤ect from a changing population and
changing neighborhood demographics. By using the share of immigrants instead of the total
immigrant population, we will be able to focus on the e¤ect of the change of racial composition,
which is more important to understanding the unique inuence of immigrants.
Year xed e¤ect Y eart is included to control for national events that a¤ect all regions
simultaneously. Since di¤erent regions might experience drastically di¤erent housing market
conditions, Metropolitan Statistical Area xed e¤ect MSAi is included. Hence, we can focus
on the e¤ect of immigration within each MSA. We also include a complex set of variables
Tractit to control for housing and demographic characteristics of a census tract, such as average
rooms, kitchen or plumb facilities, average housing tenure, average education level and average
48
household income.
Reverse causality and omitted variables are two main concerns when using OLS to estimate
the causal e¤ect of immigration on housing prices. First of all, housing prices might be one of
the factors that a¤ect immigrantslocation choice. A neighborhood with cheaper housing could
potentially attract more immigrants, who, on average, have a lower skill level. Although using
lagged immigration variable could partially control this issue, immigrants could still anticipate
future housing prices while chosing where they want to reside. Secondly, omitted variables such
as the change of neighborhood amenities could a¤ect both the immigrantslocation choice and
the local housing price; and hence bias the relevant coe¢ cients. While taking rst di¤erence in
housing price should eliminate the e¤ect of time invariant census tract characteristics, it may
not control for di¤erent trends. This means that it may still be an issue to identify the e¤ect
of immigration.
 log(price)it = + 1immi_shareit 1 + Tract
0
it2 + Y eart + it (3.2)
immi_shareit 1 = + 1IV + Tract0it2 + Y eart + it
A common way to deal with the reverse causality and the omitted variable problem is by
using instrumental variables. An ideal instrument will have a signicant impact on housing
prices through its e¤ect on immigration population only. We can then implement two stage
least square estimation specied in Equation (3.2) to identify the coe¢ cient correctly. Previous
literature suggests that immigrants tend to cluster in proximity of early immigrants enclaves
from the same source country (Bartel (1989); Card (2001)). This clustering tendency has more
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to do with their culture or language preferences than the neighborhood economic trends that
might cause endogenous problems. Hence, it could be used as an instrument to study the
impact of immigration. Since the Geolytics data does not contain detailed information about
the source country of the foreign born population, we use the pull e¤ect of the overall foreign
born as our instrument. Census tract is a very small geographic unit that contains less than
4000 residents on average, new immigrants might be attracted to the existing immigrants not
only in the specic census tract, but in the nearby regions as well. To capture the overall
geographic attraction of a census tract i; we use a simplied version of the gravity equation
derived in Saiz and Wachter (2011):
Pullit =
county_imm_popct   tract_imm_popit
county_popct   tract_popit : (3.3)
county_imm_popct is the total foreign born population and county_popct is the total popu-
lation in county c at time t: Similarly, tract_imm_popit is the total foreign born population
and tract_popit is the total population in census tract i at time t:Hence Pullit is the share of
historical immigrants in the nearby areas, which summarizes the geographic attraction to new
immigrants of census tract i located in county c at time t. We use Pullit as the instrument
variable in Equation (3.2) to recover the causal impact of immigration.
3.3.2 Quantile and Two Stage Quantile Estimation
Neighborhoods at the census tract level show great heterogeneity in terms of racial composition,
economic development, and political atmosphere. Some of the heterogeneities are observable,
while others are not. Due to their di¤erences, neighborhoods might respond to immigration
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di¤erently. For example, the main residents of neighborhood with the cheapest housing might
be lower class workers, whose political view towards immigrants might be di¤erent from other
areas in general. If that is the case, then the mean e¤ect estimated using ordinary least squares
provides a rather poor estimate of the conditional mean for the poorest neighborhood in the
sample. The obvious advantages of using quantile regression is that it can estimate the e¤ect
of immigration on the whole conditional distribution of housing price, and it is less a¤ected by
outliers.
As described by Koenker and Bassett (1978), we specify the th conditional quantile function
as Qy( jx) = x0() ; in which () is estimated by solving:
Min
2Rp
nX
i=1
 ( log(price)it     1immi_shareit 1   Tract0it2   Y eart): (3.4)
In the equation above,  is the piecewise linear loss function:
 (u) = u(   I(u < 0)): (3.5)
The focus of this study is to see whether the e¤ect of immigration varies across di¤erent
quantiles, which require us to test whether 1() = e1 for any  : To achieve this end, we
need to estimate the standard error of the coe¢ cients to test and construct condence intervals
comparing coe¢ cients describing di¤erent quantiles. It is well documented in literature that
using empirical quantile function to construct standard errors, as introduced in Koenker and
Bassett (1978), usually under-estimate the variance (Bucinsky (1995)). To construct robust
standard error, we use bootstrap methods in which both dependent and independent variables
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are re-sampled simultaneously.
To estimate the impact of immigration on the entire distribution of housing price while
treating the reverse causality and omitted variable issues, we will use two stage quantile regres-
sion methods following Portney and Chen (1996). Arias et al (2002) applied similar method to
estimate the return to education at di¤erent quantiles while addressing simultaneity and mea-
surement error biases. This estimator is essentially a quantile analog of two stage least squares
(2SLS) whose large sample properties were established in Powell (1983). The estimation is
done by rst projecting the endogenous variable immi_shareit on the matrix of exogenous
variables including the instrument Pullit, just like the rst stage in 2SLS. The rst stage OLS
projection will then replace immi_shareit when solving the model specied in Equation (3-
1). We also report the results using instrumental quantile regression introduced by Hansen and
Chernozhukov (2005, 2006).
3.4 Estimation Details and Empirical Results
3.4.1 OLS and IV
The rst stage results in table (3.2) show that the existing immigrant population have a signif-
icant pull e¤ect on the new immigrants. Specically, a census tract in a county that had a 1%
higher share of foreign born population 10 years ago will have a 0.8% higher share of foreign
born population at the present. The F-statistics in the rst stage is 239.41, much higher than
the critical value of weak IV, suggesting that the instrument has enough power. The Durbin-
Hausman test rejected the exogenous consumption at 0.01 signicance level, conrming that
endogeneity is an issue and a correct identication strategy is necessary.
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Both OLS and 2SLS results in table (3.2) suggest that immigrants have a positive e¤ect on
housing prices at the census tract level. The results are obtained following Equation (3.1) and
Equation (3.2) respectively. The OLS results suggest that a 1 unit increase of the share of the
foreign born in the last period is associated with a 0.002 greater log value of the housing price,
which is an extremely small e¤ect. In percentage term, it suggests that a 1% increase of the
share of foreign born is associated with a 0.002 percent increase in the housing value. Since the
median home value in 2000 is only 155,000 dollars, the increase in the housing value is only 3
dollars.
On the other hand, the 2SLS estimate the coe¢ cient to be 0.096, which is a much more
substantial impact. It indicates that a 1% increase of the share of foreign born will increase
housing prices by 0.096 log value, which is equal to a 0.2% increase of the housing value. The
mean value of a single family house in 2000 is 155,000 dollars and the mean change of the share
of foreign born is around 0.08. Hence the average housing value appreciation due to immigrants
is around 2480 dollars. It is still a small e¤ect, but much more substantial compared with the
OLS results.
One possible reason for the di¤erence between OLS and 2SLS could be reverse causality. If
immigrants move into a poor neighborhood, which has a slower increase in housing price, then
OLS will underestimate the positive e¤ect of immigration. By disentangling the reverse causal
e¤ect, 2SLS would return a higher positive e¤ect.
Previous literature, such as Saiz (2003, 2007) and Ottaviano and Peri (2006), have sug-
gested that immigrants bring up housing value at the metropolitan level. However, within a
metropolitan area, Saiz (2011) suggests that a 1% increase of immigrant share decreases hous-
ing value by 1%. In that paper, Saiz assumes that neighborhoods that are located near the
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existing immigrant enclaves are more attractive to new immigrants. He then constructs the
instrument variable for each census tract, which is essentially a weighted neighborhood immi-
grant population using distance to that particular census tract as weights. Compared with our
approach, except in regard to di¤erent IV, Saiz (2011) also selects a di¤erent sample. His pa-
per only focuses on metropolitan areas and years for which the decennial change in immigrant
population is substantial (at least 5% of the MSA population). In this paper, since our goal is
to test whether di¤erent neighborhoods react to immigrants di¤erently, we included all census
tracts in all the available years to cover the whole spectrum. These could be the main reasons
why the results from our analysis are di¤erent from the ones by Saiz (2011).
3.4.2 Quantile and Instrumental Quantile Estimation
Using quantile regression, we observe signicant heterogeneity of immigrants e¤ect on housing
price. In the rst part of Table (3.3), we estimate the quantile regression that specied in
Equation (3-1) at the deciles from 0.1 to 0.9. Figure (3-1) presents the same results in a more
intuitive way. While the OLS suggests that on average immigrant have a positive e¤ect on
housing price, quantile regression suggests the e¤ect is quite di¤erent for di¤erent neighbor-
hoods. For census tracts with median to expensive housing, the quantile regression suggests a
similar e¤ect of immigrants both in its direction and size. For example, for census tracts with
the housing price at the median, a 1 unit increase in the share of foreign born in the last period
is associated with a 0.003 higher log value of the housing price, which is almost negligible. The
95% condence band is quite narrow around this area, suggesting that we have very precise
estimation at the upper end of the distribution.
On the other hand, quantile regression also suggests that for census tracts with very cheap
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housing, the share of foreign born population is negatively correlated with housing price and
the e¤ects are much more substantial. For example, for census tracts with the housing price
at the 10th percentile of the price distribution, a 1% increase of the share of foreign born in
last period is associated with a 0.3% lower housing price. Though the coe¢ cients are still
signicantly di¤erent from 0, the 95% condence interval is relatively wide, suggesting that
there is more noise at the lower end of the distribution.
Although it returns signicantly larger coe¢ cients, the two stage quantile regression shows
a similar pattern as the quantile regression. In the second column of Table (3.3), we report the
coe¢ cients of the two stage quantile regression specied in Equation (3-1), replacing endogenous
variable immi_Inflowit with its projection on the matrix of exogenous variables including the
instrument Pullit , at the deciles from 0.1 to 0.9. Figure (3-2) graphs the coe¢ cients against
their quantiles, which shows a clearly rising trend across di¤erent points in the conditional
distribution of housing price. The gure suggests that at the lower end of the distribution, the
e¤ect of increased share of foreign born in the neighborhood decrease housing price. However,
the e¤ect is positive for the 70th percentile and higher. For example, if the share of foreign
born increases by 1% in the census tract with housing price at the 80th percentile, the value of
log housing price will increase by 0.98, which is equal to an increase of 8% in the housing value.
The 95% condence interval bands are very narrow in Figure (3-2), suggesting a very precise
estimation.
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Figure 3-1: Immigrant Inow and Housing Price Change: Quantile Regression
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Note: This gure displays the coe¢ cients of immigrant inow on housing price change at
di¤erent quantile levels. Coe¢ cient estimates are on the vertical axis, while the quantile
index is on the horizontal axis. Coe¢ cients are obtained by solving Equation (3-1). The
dash lines are the 95% condent interval constructed using bootstrap method.
Data Source: Neighborhood Change Database (NCDB) Tract Data from 1970-2000,
GeoLytics.
3.5 Further Results: The Change Of Housing Supply
The obvious increasing pattern of the coe¢ cients of immigration along the quantiles suggests
that there are neighborhood heterogeneities that are not captured by census tract xed e¤ect,
housing characteristics, or MSA trend. In a housing market, the equilibrium housing price is
determined by both the demand and supply. In this section, we look at the supply side stories in
search for reasons why neighborhoods react di¤erently to immigrants, using the Neighborhood
Change Database.
After immigrants move in, real estate developers might respond di¤erently in di¤erent neigh-
borhoods. A rising new housing supply might slow down housing prices and prevent it from
growing fast. Since the Neighborhood Change Database does not record housing supply changes
directly, we use the change of total housing unit between surveys to infer the new constructions.
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Figure 3-2: The E¤ect of Immigrant Inow on Housing Price Change: Instrumental Variable
Quantile Regression
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Note: This gure displays the e¤ect of immigrant inow on housing price change at
di¤erent quantile levels, using historical immigrant share in the county as an instru-
ment. Specically, coe¢ cients are from two stage quantile regression that specied in
Equation (3-1), replacing endogenous variable immi_Inflowit with its projection on
the matrix of exogenous variables including the instrument Pullit , at the deciles from
0.1 to 0.9. Coe¢ cient estimates are on the vertical axis, while the quantile index is
on the horizontal axis. The dash lines are the 95% condent interval calculated using
bootstrap.
Data Source: Neighborhood Change Database (NCDB) Tract Data from 1970-2000,
GeoLytics.
Since developers will try to build houses in neighborhoods with a prospering housing market,
and that those areas might be too expensive for new immigrants, reverse causality might be an
issue to identify the e¤ect of immigration on housing supply. We also use the pull e¤ect of the
existing immigrants in the county 20 years ago as an IV to control this issue.
We test the supply side neighborhood heterogeneity using the two stage quantile regres-
sion and report the results in Table (3.4) and Figure (3-3). The dependent variable here is
D log(NewHou sin git), which is the change of the log of the new housing supply, calculated by
taking di¤erence of the total housing unit between period t and t 1: Hence the results in Table
(3.4) and Figure (3-3) are similar to taking a di¤erence in di¤erence approach. The Figure
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(3-3) shows that the more active a neighborhood is in developing new houses, the less negative
impact immigrants have on new housing supplies. At the highest quantiles of the distribution
of new housing development, immigrants actually increase the new housing supply. Hence they
should slow down the rate of housing price increase. If poor neighborhoods happen to be those
that attract a lot of new development, then the supply side story could partially explain why
the impact of immigration on housing prices is increasing as neighborhoods get wealthier.
Figure 3-3: Immigration and Housing Supply Change: Instrumental Variable Quantile Regres-
sion
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Note: This gure displays the e¤ect of immigrant inow on housing supply change at
di¤erent quantile levels, using historical immigrant share in the county as an instru-
ment. Coe¢ cient estimates are on the vertical axis, while the quantile index is on the
horizontal axis. The dash lines are the 95% condent interval.
Data Source: Neighborhood Change Database (NCDB) Tract Data from 1970-2000,
GeoLytics.
3.6 Conclusion
The ndings in this article point to two substantive conclusions. First of all, on average,
the inows of new immigrants have a very limited inuence on housing prices at census tract
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level. Using OLS, the e¤ect of a 1% increase of the share of immigrants has little e¤ect on
housing prices. Using 2SLS, the e¤ect is much more substantial but still small. On average,
an increase of 1% in the share of immigrants increases the housing prices by 0.2%. However,
if we look at the e¤ect more closely, we will notice that the impacts of immigrants are quite
di¤erent for di¤erent neighborhoods, and looking at the average e¤ect alone will lead to a vastly
underestimated e¤ect. Hence, our second conclusion is that there are signicant neighborhood
heterogeneous e¤ects at di¤erent points in the housing price conditional distribution when we
use quantile regression. For example, at the 20th percentile of the housing price distribution,
a 1% increase in the share of immigrants will lead to a 1.3% decrease in housing price. At the
80th percentile of the housing price distribution, a 1% increase of the share of immigrants will
increase housing prices by 1%. Both marginal e¤ects are much larger, but since the e¤ects in
some neighborhoods is negative and others are positive, the e¤ect is almost cancelled out when
taking the average.
In this paper, we also study the potential reasons behind the heterogeneity, from both the
demand side and supply side. Using two stage quantile regression, the results suggest that
neighborhoods could react quite di¤erently to immigrants moving in. Neighborhoods with a
less active real estate development market tend to build fewer houses after immigrants move in.
The slowed supply might slow down the housing price growth for those neighborhoods. These
di¤erences between neighborhoods could potentially explain why the e¤ects of immigrants are
heterogeneous amongst neighborhoods.
To design an immigration policy that improves the overall welfare of the country, we need
to understand who benets from it and who pays the initial cost. We can then use other
social welfare policies to compensate those who are most negatively a¤ected by immigrants.
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The results in this paper suggest that the housing price in poor neighborhoods are negatively
a¤ected by immigrants, while housing prices in rich neighborhoods are positively a¤ected. In
other words, homeowners in poor neighborhoods are hurt by immigrants while homeowners in
rich neighborhoods benet from them. This di¤erence could have a large impact on households
wealth and should be taken into consideration when debating immigration-related policies.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics by Year
Year = 1970
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Average Housing Price 44145 22227.99 68138.86 0 13300000
Total Population 73057 2026.15 2230.55 0 82584
Foreign Born Population 73057 119.60 252.99 0 8427
Population of Mexican Origin 73057 27.65 150.48 0 5932
White Population 73057 1759.68 2017.53 0 81163
Year = 1980
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Average Housing Price 59535 152012 2228354 0 20900000
Total Population 73057 2478.58 2109.07 0 89545
Foreign Born Population 73057 182.20 344.88 0 11087
Population of Mexican Origin 73057 105.61 388.50 0 8797
White Population 73057 2036.68 1893.14 0 76199
Year = 1990
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Average Housing Price 71798 109042.40 83560.32 14 1178614
Total Population 73057 3404.33 1835.78 0 98443
Foreign Born Population 73057 270.57 487.92 0 11927
Population of Mexican Origin 73057 183.33 544.13 0 13602
White Population 73057 2735.22 1724.42 0 73216
Year = 2000
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Average Housing Price 72114 155000.90 118078.90 216 1798581
Total Population 73057 3852.09 1932.13 0 101300
Foreign Born Population 73057 425.80 655.74 0 14636
Population of Mexican Origin 73057 282.05 680.09 0 15492
White Population 73057 2941.20 1805.31 0 70879
Note: This table shows the summary statistics by census year. The unit of analysis is
census tract. The housing price is ination adjusted average housing price, normalized
to 2000 dollars.
Data Source: Neighborhood Change Database [NCDB] Tract Data from 1970 to 2000,
GeoLytics.
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Table 3.2: Immigrant Inow and Housing Price Change: OLS and 2SLS
OLS 2SLS
Second Stage First Stage
Lagged Change of Share of
Foreign Born Population 0.002*** 0.096***
(0.0007) (0.030)
Neighborhood Pull E¤ect 0.797***
(0.310)
P-Value of Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of Endogeneity 0.001
F-Statistics for excluded instrument 239.41
N 106304 106304 106304
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Note: This table shows the coe¢ cients of immigrant inow on housing price following
Equation (3.1) and (3.2). For column (1) and (2), the dependent variable is the change
of log housing price in the census tract. For column (3), the dependent variable is
the change of share of foreign born population. Though not reported in the table, all
regression included time xed e¤ect, MSA xed e¤ect and census tract characteristics.
Data Source: Neighborhood Change Database [NCDB] Tract Data from 1970 to 2000,
GeoLytics.
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Table 3.3: Quantile Regression
Dependent Variable: First Di¤erence of Log Housing Price
Quantile Lagged Change of Share of Foreign Born
Quantile Regression 2 Stage Quantile IV Quantile
0.1 -0.035** -1.228*** -0.720
(0.015) (0.023) (0.676)
0.2 -0.019* -1.24*** -0.057
(0.011) (0.040) (0.070)
0.3 -0.001 -1.077*** 0.644
(0.008) (0.043) (0.473)
0.4 0.002 -0.866*** 0.832
(0.003) (0.034) (0.586)
0.5 0.003 -0.655*** 0.990
(0.001) (0.039) (0.688)
0.6 0.003*** -0.377*** 1.132
(0.001) (0.032) (0.795)
0.7 0.003*** 0.065 1.280
(0.001) (0.054) (0.933)
0.8 0.003*** 0.980*** 1.452
(0.001) (0.094) (1.145)
0.9 0.004** 2.775*** -0.058
(0.002) (0.068) (0.106)
N=106304
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Note: This table shows the coe¢ cients of immigrant inow on housing price changes
at di¤erent quantile levels. In the rst column, coe¢ cients are from quantile regression
obtained by solving Equation (3-1). In the second and third column, coe¢ cients are
from two stage quantile regression and instrumental quantile regression that specied
in Equation (3-1), replacing endogenous variable immi_Inflowit with its projection
on the matrix of exogenous variables including the instrument Pullit , at the deciles
from 0.1 to 0.9. Though not reported in the table, all regression included time xed
e¤ect, MSA xed e¤ect and census tract characteristics. Robust standard errors are
calculated using bootstrap.
Data Source: Neighborhood Change Database [NCDB] Tract Data from 1970 to 2000,
GeoLytics.
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Table 3.4: Immigration and Housing Supply Change: Instrumental Variable Quantile Regres-
sion
Dependent Variable: The Change of Log Housing Supply Increament
q10 q20 q30 q40 q50
Immigrant Inow -6.559*** -4.893*** -3.824*** -2.784*** -2.069***
(0.159) (0.133) (0.110) (0.082) (0.093)
q60 q70 q80 q95
-1.451*** -0.630*** 0.301*** 3.442***
(0.073) (0.061) (0.092) (0.263)
Note: This table displays the e¤ect of immigrant inow on housing supply change at
di¤erent quantile levels. Though not reported in the table, all regression included time
xed e¤ect, MSA xed e¤ect and census tract housing characteristics.
Data Source: Neighborhood Change Database (NCDB) Tract Data from 1970-2000,
GeoLytics.
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